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Seminar series in Analytic Philosophy 2009-10
February 26
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia), 16:00
Sara Bizarro (LanCog Group, Centro de Filosofia)
Science Without Data? Phenomenal Consciousness and Heterophenomenology.
The word consciousness is used for several types of mental events: wakefulness, attention, recalling, emotions, thoughts, beliefs, self-consciousness etc. Cognitive Science and Psychology research these types of events. Phenomenal Consciousness is defined in the Philosophy of Mind as “subjective experience” or as the “what it is like for somebody to be that person in that moment”. All the mental events listed above are usually accompanied by some sort of phenomenal subjective feeling for those experiencing them. In contemporary Philosophy of Mind it is often argued that this phenomenal side of consciousness cannot be the object of scientific enquiry (Chalmers) and that, therefore, a science of consciousness is doomed from the start (Nagel). On the other side of the debate, heterophenomenologists (Dennett) argue that we are justified in using reports of individuals regarding their subjective experience as data in our scientific enquiries about consciousness. In this talk I will discuss weather the reports of subjects can be considered reliable data for a scientific study of consciousness using as reference the debate about the legitimacy of mental imagery reports presented by Pylyshyn, Shepard and Kosslyn
January 8
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia), 16:00
Gonçalo Santos (LanCog Group, Centro de Filosofia - Logos, Universidade de Barcelona)
A Not So Fine Modal Version of Generality Relativism
Russell's Paradox is standardly interpreted as showing that there cannot be a set of all sets. But at the same time that it establishes something, this result raises some peculiar questions. One could ask, for example, how to understand a collection that is not a set or why is it that there cannot be a set of all sets. In the following we will say some things about the first question, but will be particularly concerned with an answer that has been provided for the second. We thus begin by presenting the naive and the iterative conceptions of set, describe the construction of the set-theoretical hierarchy and discuss the notion of proper class. The discussion then moves on to whether it is possible to make sense of the claim that the set-theoretical hierarchy is to be understood as being indefinitely extensible. In particular, we discuss a modal version of generality relativism that has been put forward by Kit Fine and try to understand if it allows us to come up with a non self-defeating formulation of the generality relativist thesis. We will argue that Fine's modal version does not appear to be of much help in this task.
December 11
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia), 16:00
Teresa Marques (LanCog Group, Centro de Filosofia - Logos, Universidade de Barcelona)
Sobre a Discórdia e a Retractação
No debate contemporâneo entre relativistas e contextualistas, tem-se apelado insistentemente a dados sobre o desacordo entre falantes, e sobre retractações. Os relativistas, em concreto, mantêm que estão em melhor posição para explicar as nossas intuições com respeito aos casos de aparente persistência de desacordo sobre assuntos ditos subjectivos (pelo menos, dependentes de uma determinada perspectiva), desde a moral, a estética ou o humor, à dita modalidade epistémica. Contudo, o que tem faltado no debate actual é uma explicação que clarifique a noção de desacordo, bem como a de retractação. Nesta comunicação, distinguirei dois tipos de desacordo: o desacordo sobre conteúdo e o desacordo pragmático. A discussão tem focado principalmente a ideia de desacordo sobre conteúdo. Proponho condições necessárias e suficientes para caracterizar o desacordo sobre conteúdo, e argumento que nenhuma forma de relativismo no debate actual, seja o moderado ou o radical, está em melhor posição para explicar qualquer tipo de desacordo sobre conteúdo em questões subjectivas. Proponho ainda que as retractações podem igualmente distinguir-se como retractações sobre conteúdo e retractações pragmáticas, e que uma retractação pode plausivelmente ser vista como um desacordo que um sujeito tem consigo mesmo no passado. Finalmente, sugiro que em questões consideradas subjectivas o que há a estudar é o que chamarei desacordo pragmático, a ser caracterizado mais como um conflito de atitudes do que uma discussão sobre a verdade ou falsidade de um putativo conteúdo literal, e sugiro que uma perspectiva iluminadora consiste em tratar o acordo ou a concórdia nos termos de David Lewis, como uma solução para os problemas de coordenação de interesses subjectivos.
October 30
Room 5.2, 14:00
João Branquinho (Universidade de Lisboa, LanCog Group)
Existence IS NOT a Higher-Order Predicate
The negative claim of the talk is that the Frege-Russell view of the existence predicate as a higher-order predicate is profoundly mistaken and should be abandoned (even with respect to general statements of existence such as “Flying mammals exist”). The positive claim of the talk is that, in the context of first-order discourse, the existence predicate could and should be invariably seen as a first-order predicate and existence as a bona fide property of individuals (pace Kant, Hume, Frege, Russell and others). Two important assumptions concerning existence are shared with the Frege-Russell tradition, though: (a) There are no non-existent objects; (b) The relevant concept of existence is best captured by the existential quantifier of standard predicate logic.
Nota: Esta sessão do Seminário de Filosofia Analítica ocorre também como IXº Seminário do Projecto A QUESTÃO DE DEUS - HISTÓRIA E CRÍTICA, FCT / CFUL [PTDC/FIL/64249/2006]
October 8
Anfiteatro III, 15:00
Duncan Pritchard (University of Edinburgh)
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology
It is argued that there are two ‘master’ intuitions about knowledge - an anti-luck intuition and an ability intuition - and that these impose distinct epistemic demands. It is claimed that recognising this fact leads one towards a new proposal in the theory of knowledge - anti-luck virtue epistemology - which can avoid the problems that afflict other theories of knowledge. This proposal is motivated in contrast to two other ways of thinking about knowledge which are shown to be ultimately unsuccessful: anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology. Finally, a diagnosis is offered of why our concept of knowledge should have the kind of structure dictated by anti-luck virtue epistemology.
Nota: Esta sessão do Seminário de Filosofia Analítica está integrada no XIV Colóquio Ibero-Americano de Filosofia (FLUL, 7-9 de Outubro de 2009) como conferência convidada.
Encontro de Filosofia Antiga
Platão sobre a Linguagem e o Conhecimento
22 de Janeiro de 2010, 16:00
Petrus Hispanus Lectures
The Petrus Hispanus Lectures are delivered every other academic year at the University of Lisbon by a leading figure in current research about the nature of mind, cognition and language. The first Petrus Hispanus Lectures were delivered in 1998 by Hilary Putnam (Harvard) and were organized by the Masters Programme in the Philosophy of Language and Mind, the Portuguese Philosophy Society, and the Journal Disputatio. The second Petrus Hispanus Lectures were delivered in 2000 by Richard Jeffrey ( Princeton ) and were organized by the Portuguese Philosophy Society. As of their third edition in 2003 the Petrus Hispanus Lectures are organized by the Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon (LanCog Research Group) and the Journal Disputatio.
2009 Lectures Tyler Burge (UCLA) October 1 and 2